Law covered in these questions
- Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347
- Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17
- Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107
- Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53
- Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53
- Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338
- Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638
- Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18
- Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210
- Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55
- Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27
- Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159
- Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306
- Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179
All 12 questions with answers
Try them above first, then read the worked answers below.
Question 1 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Nita and her adult daughter Ola bought a flat as a buy-to-let investment. It was registered in Ola's sole name, but Nita paid 40% of the price and Ola the rest by mortgage. They never discussed ownership and never lived there. Nita claims a share. Which of the following best describes the court's likely approach?
- A resulting trust giving Nita a share proportionate to her contribution.Correct answer
- A common intention constructive trust based on the whole course of dealing.
- A presumption that Ola owns the whole, as sole registered proprietor.
- A presumption of equal shares, as between family members.
- A presumption of advancement in Ola's favour.
Where property is bought primarily as an investment rather than a home, the Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott approach for domestic homes does not necessarily apply. In Laskar v Laskar, involving a mother and daughter buying a property to let, the Court of Appeal applied a resulting trust, so the beneficial shares reflected the contributions to the price. Nita would therefore take about 40%, subject to how the mortgage liability is treated. Equal shares is the presumption for joint-names domestic homes, and the presumption of advancement does not operate from a parent in favour of a child in this way.
Law basis: Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347; Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17Question 2 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Pia's partner Ray bought a house in his sole name with a mortgage. They never discussed ownership. From the date of purchase, Pia paid half of every monthly mortgage instalment directly to the lender for 15 years. They now separate. Which of the following best describes Pia's position?
- She has no claim without an express agreement about ownership.
- A common intention to share can be inferred from her mortgage payments.Correct answer
- She is entitled to a refund of her payments as a loan only.
- She is entitled to half under the presumption of equality.
- She has no claim because she is not on the register.
In a sole-name case, the claimant must establish a common intention that she should have a beneficial share, followed by detrimental reliance. In Lloyds Bank v Rosset, Lord Bridge stated that direct contributions to the purchase price, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily justify the inference of such a common intention. Pia's regular payment of half the mortgage instalments supports an inferred common intention constructive trust. The presumption of equal shares in Stack v Dowden applies to joint-names cases, not sole-name cases, so the starting point here is sole ownership.
Law basis: Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107; Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17Question 3 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Sol and Tess lived in a house in Sol's sole name. The court has found that they shared a common intention that Tess should have a beneficial interest, on which she relied, but they never discussed the size of the shares. Which of the following best describes how the court will quantify Tess's share?
- By reference only to her financial contributions to the price.
- As one half, because equity is equality.
- As the share Sol is willing to concede.
- As the share the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing.Correct answer
- As one quarter, which is the conventional award in such cases.
Once a common intention to share has been established in a sole-name case, the court determines the size of the share by looking for the parties' actual intention, express or inferred. If none can be found, it may impute one, awarding the share it considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property (Stack v Dowden; Jones v Kernott, at para 52; Abbott v Abbott). The court is not confined to financial contributions, and there is no presumption of equality in sole-name cases. There is no conventional fraction.
Law basis: Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53; Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53Question 4 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Uri lived with Vale in a house in Vale's sole name. Vale told Uri she was too young to be on the deeds but that the house would be their home together. Relying on this, Uri did heavy work on the house, breaking up concrete, demolishing a shed and building a new one. Which of the following best describes Uri's claim?
- She has no claim, because physical work is not a financial contribution.
- She has no claim, because Vale's statement was only an excuse.
- She is entitled to half, because the house was to be their home together.
- She is entitled to wages for her work, but no share in the house.
- She may have a share under a constructive trust.Correct answer
An express common intention may be found from words used, even where they are an excuse for not putting the claimant on the title. In Eves v Eves, the man told his partner she was too young to be on the title; that showed she was intended to have an interest. Her heavy physical work in reliance on it was sufficient detriment, and she was awarded a quarter share under a constructive trust. Physical work of an unusual kind can amount to detrimental reliance even if not a financial contribution. The size of share is not automatically half.
Law basis: Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338; Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638Question 5 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
For nearly 30 years, Wes worked unpaid on his elderly cousin Xavi's farm. Xavi never said expressly that Wes would inherit, but he made remarks such as handing Wes a life insurance bonus notice saying 'that's for my death duties'. Xavi died without a will leaving the farm. Wes claims the farm. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- His claim fails, because no express promise was ever made.
- His claim may succeed, because an assurance can be inferred from conduct if clear enough in context.Correct answer
- His claim fails, because a promise to leave property by will is revocable.
- His claim fails, because estoppel cannot arise from family relationships.
- His claim succeeds only if he can show he was promised the farm in writing.
In Thorner v Major, on similar facts, the House of Lords held that a proprietary estoppel can arise from an assurance that is oblique and inferred from conduct, provided it is clear enough in the context to be reasonably understood as intended to be relied on. The fact that a will can be revoked does not prevent an estoppel arising where the claimant reasonably relied to his detriment (see also Gillett v Holt). No writing is required. Wes's long unpaid work in reliance on the inferred assurance supports his claim to the farm.
Law basis: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18; Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210Question 6 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Yew Ltd, a property developer, reached an oral 'agreement in principle' with Zara to buy her block of flats once Yew obtained planning permission. Both knew the agreement was not legally binding. Yew spent large sums obtaining permission, then Zara raised her price. Yew claims proprietary estoppel. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- Yew succeeds, because it relied on Zara's assurance to its detriment.
- Yew fails, because it knew there was no binding agreement and expected one would follow.Correct answer
- Yew succeeds, because Zara acted unconscionably by raising her price.
- Yew fails, because estoppel never applies to companies.
- Yew succeeds, but only to the extent of its planning costs.
In Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd the House of Lords held that proprietary estoppel was not available to a developer who had relied on an agreement in principle that both parties knew was binding in honour only. The developer did not believe it had, or would be given, a certain interest in the land; it was taking a commercial risk that a formal contract would follow. Unconscionable conduct alone is not sufficient. Companies can rely on estoppel in principle, and in Cobbe the developer recovered on a different basis, in unjust enrichment, for the value of its services.
Law basis: Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55Question 7 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Andy worked for low wages on his parents' farm for 30 years, relying on repeated assurances that he would inherit a substantial part of it. After a family dispute his parents cut him out of their wills. Andy establishes proprietary estoppel while his parents are still alive. Which of the following best describes the remedy the court is likely to start from?
- Compensation only for the wages Andy lost.
- An immediate transfer of the whole farm.
- Nothing until his parents die.
- His expectation, adjusted for early receipt.Correct answer
- A remedy limited to the cost of his detriment.
In Guest v Guest the Supreme Court held that the starting point is that the court should fulfil the claimant's expectation, the purpose being to remedy the unconscionability of the promisor's going back on the assurance. The court may then adjust the remedy, including to reflect accelerated receipt where the claimant obtains the benefit before the promisor's death, for example by awarding a discounted capital sum. Compensation measured only by the detriment is not the starting point, although the remedy must not be out of all proportion to the detriment.
Law basis: Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27Question 8 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Bea cared for her elderly neighbour Cy for several years, doing shopping and some nursing, for little pay. Cy assured her she would inherit his £1.2 million house, but then died having left it elsewhere. A court finds estoppel established, but the value of the care is about £200,000. Which of the following best describes the likely remedy?
- The whole house, because that was the expectation created.
- Nothing, because Bea was partly paid for her work.
- An award that is proportionate, which may be much less than the house.Correct answer
- Exactly the market value of her services, with no further award.
- A life interest in the house only.
Although the starting point is the claimant's expectation (Guest v Guest), the court's aim is to remedy unconscionability, and the remedy must be proportionate to the detriment suffered. In Jennings v Rice the Court of Appeal awarded a carer £200,000 rather than the house worth £435,000 that she had expected, because satisfying the expectation in full would have been out of all proportion to the detriment. Bea's partial payment does not defeat the claim, and the court is not limited to a strict valuation of her services or to a life interest.
Law basis: Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27Question 9 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Dot moved in as housekeeper for Ed's family and stayed for decades without pay after being encouraged to believe she could live in the house for the rest of her life. When Ed's children try to evict her, she claims an estoppel. The children argue she would have stayed anyway out of affection, so there was no reliance. Which of the following best describes the burden of proof on reliance?
- Dot must prove she would not have stayed but for the assurance.
- Reliance is irrelevant once an assurance is proved.
- Reliance is presumed, so the children must disprove it.Correct answer
- The children must prove the assurance was never made.
- Dot must prove reliance by documentary evidence.
In Greasley v Cooke, the Court of Appeal held that once it is shown that assurances were made and the claimant acted to her detriment, there is a rebuttable presumption that she did so in reliance on the assurances. The burden then shifts to the defendants to prove that she did not rely on them. Reliance remains a requirement, so the option saying it is irrelevant is wrong. Dot need not prove reliance by documents, and the children cannot defeat her claim merely by suggesting she may have stayed out of affection.
Law basis: Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306Question 10 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Fay sold part of her land, relying on assurances from the council, Gem District Council, that she would be given access over the council's road to her remaining land. The council then fenced off the access, leaving her land landlocked and worthless. Which of the following best describes Fay's likely remedy?
- Damages only, because the council never signed any grant.
- No remedy, because an easement must be granted by deed.
- The grant of an easement of access through proprietary estoppel.Correct answer
- A licence to cross the road revocable on reasonable notice.
- The transfer of the council's road to Fay.
In Crabb v Arun District Council, the claimant sold part of his land relying on the council's assurance of access, and the council then blocked it. The Court of Appeal held that a proprietary estoppel arose and the minimum equity to do justice was the grant of an easement of access, which in that case was granted without payment because of the council's conduct. Proprietary estoppel is not barred by the absence of a deed (LP(MP)A 1989 s 2(5); Yaxley v Gotts). A revocable licence would not satisfy the equity, and transfer of the road would be disproportionate.
Law basis: Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179Question 11 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Hal's home is registered in his wife Iva's sole name. Hal made no payment to the price or mortgage, and there was never any discussion of ownership. He spent several weekends decorating the house and supervised builders during renovation. Hal now claims a beneficial share. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- He has a share, because his work improved the house.
- He has a share under a resulting trust for the value of his work.
- He has a share, because he was in actual occupation.
- He has a half share, because he is married to Iva.
- He is unlikely to have any beneficial share.Correct answer
In Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset, the House of Lords held that a wife who supervised builders and did some decorating, without any express agreement about ownership and without contributing to the price, had no beneficial interest. Such conduct was too trifling to found an inference of a common intention to share. Although later cases suggest a wider range of conduct may be considered, minor work of this kind remains insufficient. Marriage does not of itself give a share in property law, though family law remedies may exist on divorce, and actual occupation protects only an existing interest.
Law basis: Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107Question 12 · Implied trusts and proprietary estoppelDraft, pending solicitor review
Fern's partner Gus left her for another woman, telling her: 'the house is yours and everything in it'. He never transferred the registered title. Relying on this, Fern spent most of her modest savings on repairs and improvements. Gus later tries to evict her. Which of the following best describes the remedy a court is likely to grant?
- A licence to occupy for as long as Gus permits.
- A transfer of the freehold to Fern, if needed to satisfy the equity.Correct answer
- Repayment of the money Fern spent, with interest.
- Nothing, because a gift of land must be made by deed.
- A tenancy for life at a market rent.
Where proprietary estoppel is established, the court decides the minimum equity needed to do justice, starting from the expectation created (Guest v Guest). In Pascoe v Turner, on similar facts, the Court of Appeal ordered the man to transfer the fee simple to the woman, because a lesser remedy such as a licence would leave her vulnerable to further unconscionable conduct by him. The imperfect gift is not fatal, since estoppel operates despite the lack of a deed. A revocable licence or a mere refund would not reflect the expectation or protect her.
Law basis: Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27More Land Law topics
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