Law covered in these questions
- R v Jogee
- Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8
- R v Becerra (1975) 62 Cr App R 212
- R v Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005
- R v Mitchell and King (1999) 163 JP 75
- R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402
- R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8
- R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129
- DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350
- R v Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710
- Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50
- doctrine of innocent agency
- Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1)
- R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057
All 14 questions with answers
Try them above first, then read the worked answers below.
Question 1 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Ali and Ben agree to rob a shopkeeper. Ben knows that Ali sometimes carries a knife, and foresees that he might use it. During the robbery Ali stabs and kills the shopkeeper. Ben did not intend that anyone should be seriously hurt. Which of the following best describes Ben's liability for murder?
- He is not guilty of murder unless he intended to assist or encourage Ali to cause serious harm.Correct answer
- He is guilty of murder, because he foresaw that Ali might use the knife on someone during the robbery.
- He is guilty of murder, because he took part in a joint enterprise that resulted in death.
- He is guilty of murder only if he was present when Ali stabbed the shopkeeper.
- He is not guilty of any homicide offence, because Ali alone struck the fatal blow.
In R v Jogee the Supreme Court held that the mental element for secondary liability is an intention to assist or encourage the principal to commit the crime, acting with knowledge of any facts or circumstances necessary for it to be criminal. Foresight that the principal might commit the crime is no longer sufficient in itself, though it is evidence from which the jury may infer intention. So Ben is guilty of murder only if he intended to assist or encourage Ali to kill or cause really serious harm, which may include a conditional intention. If not, he may still be guilty of manslaughter. Presence is not a requirement.
Law basis: R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8Question 2 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Cara drives Dan to a house to collect a drug debt. She knows Dan has a baseball bat and she agrees with him that, if the debtor refuses to pay, Dan should 'give him a proper beating' to teach him a lesson. The debtor refuses and Dan beats him to death. Which of the following best describes Cara's liability?
- She is not guilty of any homicide offence, because she waited outside in the car.
- She is guilty of murder only if she personally intended the debtor to die from the beating.
- She is guilty only of assault, because she did not take part in the beating herself.
- She may be guilty of murder, as she intended to assist serious harm if the condition arose.Correct answer
- She is guilty only of manslaughter, because she hoped the debtor would pay and avoid violence.
Under R v Jogee, the secondary party must intend to assist or encourage the commission of the crime, and this intention may be conditional. Where the parties share a common purpose that, if a condition arises, the principal will use violence causing really serious harm, the secondary party who intentionally assists that purpose has the mens rea for murder. Cara agreed that Dan should give a 'proper beating' if the debtor refused, which the jury could find was an intention to assist causing really serious harm. She need not intend death, as murder requires only intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and she need not be present at the scene.
Law basis: R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8Question 3 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Eli joins Fin in a plan to frighten a rival by smashing up his car. Eli intends only damage and some minor scuffles, not serious injury. During the incident Fin, without Eli's agreement, punches the rival hard; he falls, hits his head and dies. Fin intended serious harm. Which of the following best describes Eli's liability?
- He is not guilty of any homicide offence, because he did not intend any serious harm.
- He is guilty of murder only if he could reasonably have foreseen the hard punch thrown by Fin.
- He may be guilty of manslaughter, as he joined an unlawful act obviously risking some harm.Correct answer
- He is guilty of murder, because he took part in the attack in which the rival died.
- He is not guilty of any homicide offence, because Fin acted beyond their agreement.
R v Jogee confirmed that if a person participates in an unlawful enterprise involving violence, and death results, but he lacks the intention to assist or encourage the causing of really serious harm, he may be guilty of manslaughter, provided that a reasonable person would have recognised the risk of some harm resulting from the enterprise. Eli intended minor scuffles, which carry an obvious risk of some harm, so he can be convicted of manslaughter even though Fin is guilty of murder. He lacks the mens rea for murder. Only an overwhelming supervening act, so different that it is no longer part of the enterprise, would relieve him of all liability.
Law basis: R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8Question 4 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Gus and Hal plan a night-time burglary of a warehouse. They agree no weapons will be taken. Unknown to Hal, Gus brings a loaded gun. When a security guard disturbs them, Gus shoots him dead. Hal had no idea that Gus had a gun. Which of the following best describes Hal's potential liability for the death?
- He is guilty of murder only if the guard was killed in Hal's presence and with his knowledge.
- He is guilty of murder, because he was a party to the burglary in which the guard died.
- He may escape liability for the death if the shooting was an overwhelming supervening event.Correct answer
- He is guilty of murder if a reasonable person would have foreseen that Gus might kill.
- He is guilty of manslaughter in every case, because burglary is a dangerous unlawful act.
In R v Jogee the Supreme Court explained that a secondary party will not be liable for a killing where the act of the principal was an overwhelming supervening event, so different from anything contemplated that it relegates the secondary party's acts to history. Hal agreed to an unarmed burglary and had no idea Gus had a gun; the unexpected use of a loaded firearm is capable of being such an event. Whether it is so is a question for the jury. If it is not, Hal could at most be guilty of manslaughter if a reasonable person would have recognised a risk of some harm. Objective foresight is never enough for murder.
Law basis: R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8Question 5 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Ian, Jo and Kai break into a house to steal. Ian gives Kai a knife to use if anyone disturbs them. When the elderly occupier appears, Ian says 'There's someone coming. Let's go', and climbs out of the window. Kai stabs the occupier to death. Which of the following best describes whether Ian effectively withdrew?
- He did, because he physically left the house before Kai attacked the occupier.
- He did not, but only because he failed to inform the police of the plan in advance.
- He did, because withdrawal is always effective once the party has left the scene.
- He did, because he made his intention to leave clear before the stabbing happened.
- He did not, as at that late stage more than a quick word and departure was needed.Correct answer
To withdraw from a joint enterprise, a secondary party must do more than simply leave; what is required depends on the stage the crime has reached. In R v Becerra, on almost identical facts, the defendant who said 'Come on, let's go' and jumped out of a window had not withdrawn, because at that late stage, having supplied the knife, something more was needed, such as physically intervening to stop the attack. Ian provided the knife and gave only a casual warning. Notice to the police is not always required, though it can be relevant. Leaving the scene is not automatically enough.
Law basis: R v Becerra (1975) 62 Cr App R 212; R v Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005Question 6 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Late at night, a fight breaks out spontaneously outside a takeaway between Lee's group and another group. Lee punches one man and then, as the fighting continues, shouts 'I'm off' and walks away down the street. After he leaves, his friends kick the man to death. Which of the following best describes whether Lee may have withdrawn?
- He cannot have, because withdrawal always requires timely communication to every other party.
- He may have, but only if he also tried to stop the others from continuing the attack.
- He may have, as in spontaneous violence walking away can be enough to withdraw.Correct answer
- He cannot have, because he had already used violence on the victim before leaving.
- He cannot have, because withdrawal is never possible once an attack has begun.
In cases of spontaneous rather than pre-planned violence, the courts have recognised that withdrawal may be achieved more easily. In R v Mitchell and King the Court of Appeal held that, in a spontaneous attack, it is not necessary for a defendant to communicate his withdrawal to the others; walking away before the fatal blow may be sufficient, depending on the facts. Lee's shout and departure before the fatal kicking are therefore capable of amounting to withdrawal, which is a question for the jury. He remains liable for his own punch. The stricter requirements in planned enterprises, illustrated by R v Becerra, do not necessarily apply.
Law basis: R v Mitchell and King (1999) 163 JP 75Question 7 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Mo walks past a group of men who are assaulting a man in an alleyway. He stops and watches for several minutes, enjoying the spectacle, but says and does nothing. The victim is seriously injured. Mo is charged as a secondary party to the assault. Which of the following best describes his liability?
- He is liable, because he took pleasure in the attack and so approved of it.
- He is not liable, because a secondary party must always provide physical assistance.
- He is liable, because his voluntary presence at the scene encouraged the attackers.
- He is not liable unless his presence encouraged them and he intended it to.Correct answer
- He is liable, because he failed to intervene or call the police during the attack.
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to make a person a secondary party. In R v Clarkson soldiers who watched a rape were not guilty as there was no evidence that they encouraged it or intended to do so. To be liable for encouraging, the defendant's presence must in fact encourage the principal and he must intend it to do so. Mo's private enjoyment does not amount to encouragement unless communicated, and there is no general duty to intervene or call the police. Encouragement does not need physical assistance, so that option goes too far, but here there is no evidence of either.
Law basis: R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402; R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8Question 8 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Ned, who runs a tool-hire business, lends Ola cutting equipment knowing she intends to use it to break into premises to steal, though he does not know which premises or when. A week later Ola uses it to break into a bank and steal cash. Which of the following best describes Ned's liability?
- He is not liable, because he was not present when Ola broke into the bank.
- He may be an accessory, as he knew the type of crime Ola intended.Correct answer
- He is liable only if he received a share of the money stolen from the bank.
- He is not liable, because he did not know which premises Ola would break into or when.
- He is not liable, because lending equipment is a lawful business transaction.
A secondary party need not know the precise details of the crime. In R v Bainbridge, the supplier of cutting equipment used to break into a bank was liable because he knew the type of crime intended, even though he did not know the specific premises or date. DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell extended this to cover crimes within the range of offences the accessory contemplated. Ned intentionally assisted Ola, knowing she planned to break in to steal. He need not be present or share in the proceeds. Supplying goods in the course of business does not prevent liability where the supplier intends to assist and knows the essential matters.
Law basis: R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129; DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350Question 9 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Pat, aged 14, persuades her 19-year-old boyfriend to have sexual intercourse with her. He is charged with a sexual offence against a child under 16. The prosecution also considers charging Pat as a secondary party, on the basis that she encouraged him. Which of the following best describes Pat's liability?
- She can be liable, because she intentionally encouraged him to commit the offence.
- She cannot be liable, because a child under 16 cannot be convicted of any crime.
- She can be liable only if she was the one who first suggested intercourse to him.
- She can be liable, because her consent is irrelevant to an offence of this kind.
- She cannot be liable, as the offence exists to protect girls in her position.Correct answer
Under the rule in R v Tyrrell, a person cannot be a secondary party to an offence where the offence was created to protect a class of persons to which she belongs and she is the victim. Tyrrell concerned a girl under 16 who encouraged a man to have intercourse with her; she could not be convicted of abetting the offence against herself. Pat is the person the law is designed to protect, so she cannot be liable, however much she encouraged the boyfriend. Children aged 10 and over can be criminally liable generally, so the 'under 16' option is wrong. Her consent is irrelevant to his liability, but not to the Tyrrell principle.
Law basis: R v Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710Question 10 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Quinn sends his eight-year-old nephew into a shop with instructions to take sweets and bring them out without paying. The boy does as he is told, not understanding that this is wrong. Which of the following best describes Quinn's liability for the theft?
- He is the principal, having acted through an innocent agent.Correct answer
- He is not liable, because he did not personally enter the shop.
- He is liable only for encouraging the boy, not for the theft itself.
- He is not liable, because the boy cannot be convicted of the theft.
- He is liable as a secondary party, with the boy treated as the principal.
Where a defendant uses an innocent agent, such as a child under the age of criminal responsibility, to commit the actus reus of an offence, the defendant is treated as the principal offender. A child under 10 cannot be guilty of an offence (Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50), so the boy is an innocent agent and Quinn is liable for the theft as principal. He cannot be a secondary party because there is no guilty principal. His absence from the shop is irrelevant, as the appropriation is attributed to him. Encouraging or assisting offences could also be considered, but the theft itself is his.
Law basis: Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50; doctrine of innocent agencyQuestion 11 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Ray plans to shoot his ex-partner's new boyfriend. He hides in the boyfriend's car with a loaded shotgun. When the boyfriend gets in, Ray points the gun at him, but the boyfriend grabs the barrel and escapes before Ray can release the safety catch. Which of the following best describes Ray's liability for attempted murder?
- He is guilty, as his acts were more than merely preparatory to the killing.Correct answer
- He is guilty, because he had formed the intention to kill when he entered the car.
- He is not guilty, because his acts were only preparatory until he released the safety catch.
- He is not guilty, because he voluntarily abandoned the attempt before firing.
- He is not guilty, because he had not yet done the last act needed to fire the gun.
Under s 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, a person is guilty of an attempt if, with intent to commit an offence, he does an act which is more than merely preparatory to its commission. In R v Jones, on very similar facts, the Court of Appeal held that once the defendant got into the car and pointed the loaded gun, his acts were more than merely preparatory, even though he still had to remove the safety catch and pull the trigger. There is no 'last act' requirement. Intention alone is insufficient without such an act. Ray did not abandon the plan voluntarily; he was disarmed, and abandonment is not a defence anyway.
Law basis: Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1); R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057 ↗Question 12 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Sid is arrested by police a yard from the door of a post office. He has an imitation firearm and a threatening note demanding money in his pocket. He had walked towards the door, hesitated, and walked away and back again before being stopped. He never entered. Which of the following best describes his liability for attempted robbery?
- He is probably not guilty, because he had not used any force on any person.
- He is guilty, because he intended to commit robbery and had the means with him.
- He is guilty, because he was only a yard from the door of the post office.
- He is probably not guilty, as he had not yet gone beyond preparation.Correct answer
- He is guilty, because carrying an imitation firearm shows that he had embarked.
In R v Campbell, on these facts, the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for attempted robbery: a defendant who had not even entered the post office had not done an act that was more than merely preparatory under s 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, and so had not embarked on the crime proper. Intention and the means to commit the offence are not enough, and proximity in distance is not the test. Force is an element of the full offence, so its absence is not the reason. Sid may, however, be guilty of firearms offences. The line between preparation and attempt is a question for the jury, but there must be evidence fit for them.
Law basis: R v Campbell (1991) 93 Cr App R 350; Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1) ↗Question 13 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Tom buys a package he believes contains heroin and agrees to deliver it to a buyer. Police stop him and test the powder, which turns out to be a harmless herbal substance. He is charged with attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with a controlled drug. Which of the following best describes his liability?
- He cannot be guilty, because the substance was not a controlled drug at all.
- He may be guilty, as an attempt can be committed even if the offence is impossible.Correct answer
- He may be guilty only if he could have obtained real heroin from the same source.
- He cannot be guilty, because he did not commit the actus reus of any offence.
- He cannot be guilty, because it was impossible to deal in heroin with that substance.
Under s 1(2) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, a person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence even though the facts are such that commission of the offence is impossible. Under s 1(3), if the defendant's intention would have been an intention to commit the offence had the facts been as he believed them to be, he is regarded as having that intention. In R v Shivpuri the House of Lords held that a man who believed he was dealing in heroin, when the substance was harmless, was guilty of an attempt. Tom's belief that the powder was heroin is enough, and the impossibility of the full offence is no defence.
Law basis: Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(2) and (3); R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1 ↗Question 14 · Accessorial liability and attemptsDraft, pending solicitor review
Uma attacks her landlord with a hammer during an argument, intending to cause him really serious injury but not intending to kill him. He survives with a fractured skull. She is charged with attempted murder. Which of the following best describes her liability?
- She is not guilty, as attempted murder needs an intention to kill.Correct answer
- She is guilty, because the use of a hammer shows that she intended to kill him.
- She is guilty, because an intention to cause really serious harm is enough for murder.
- She is not guilty, because the landlord's skull fracture is not a life-threatening injury.
- She is guilty, because she was at least reckless as to whether the landlord would die.
Although the mens rea for murder includes an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, attempted murder requires an intention to kill (R v Whybrow). Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, the mens rea of an attempt is generally an intention to bring about the consequence of the full offence, and for attempted murder that consequence is death. Uma intended only really serious harm, so she is not guilty of attempted murder, though she is guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent under s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Recklessness is not enough. The use of a hammer is evidence of intent, but the jury have found she did not intend to kill.
Law basis: R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141; Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1 ↗More Criminal Law and Practice topics
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