Law covered in these questions
- Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428
- McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295
- Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613
- Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22
- Compensation Act 2006 s 3
- Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20
- Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074
- Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750
- Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2
- Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602
- Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467
- Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794
- Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349
- McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621
All 19 questions with answers
Try them above first, then read the worked answers below.
Question 1 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Patient Ali attends A&E after drinking poisoned tea, and the doctor negligently sends him home without examining him. It is later shown that Ali would have died from the poison even if treated properly. Which statement best describes the hospital's liability for his death?
- The hospital is liable, because the poison was a foreseeable cause of death.
- The hospital is liable, because the doctor breached a duty of care.
- The hospital is liable, because the negligence increased the risk of death.
- The hospital is liable for half of the loss, because causation is uncertain.
- The hospital is not liable for the death, because the negligence did not cause it on a but-for basis.Correct answer
Breach of duty is not enough: the claimant must prove that the damage would not have happened but for the breach. Ali would have died in any event, so the breach did not cause his death.
Law basis: Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428Question 2 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Aled, a steel erector, falls from a height and is killed. His employer had failed to provide a safety harness, in breach of duty. Evidence shows that Aled never wore a harness when one was provided and had said he would never wear one. His widow sues the employer. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- It succeeds, as the employer's breach of duty in failing to provide a harness is admitted.
- It succeeds, as the employer must prove that the breach made no difference to the outcome.
- It succeeds in part, with damages reduced for his attitude towards wearing a harness.
- It fails, as it is likely he would not have worn a harness even if one were provided.Correct answer
- It fails, as an employee who takes risks accepts responsibility for his own death.
In McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd the House of Lords held that an employer who failed to provide a safety belt was not liable for an employee's death, because on the evidence he would not have worn one even if it had been provided. The claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that, but for the breach, the harm would not have occurred. Proving breach is not enough. The burden of proof on causation remains on the claimant. Since the breach caused nothing, there is no basis for an apportionment for contributory negligence, and consent is not the issue.
Law basis: McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295Question 3 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Gethin develops pneumoconiosis from inhaling silica dust at work. Most of the dust came from a source for which his employer was not at fault, but a smaller, more than negligible amount came from machinery that the employer negligently failed to fit with extractors. Which of the following best describes the employer's liability?
- It is not liable, as he cannot show that the disease would not have occurred but for the negligence.
- It is liable only if the negligent dust was the main cause of the disease he suffered.
- It is not liable, as the greater part of the dust came from a non-negligent source.
- It is liable, as the negligent dust made a material contribution to the disease.Correct answer
- It is liable only if he proves the negligent dust doubled his risk of developing the disease.
In Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw the House of Lords held that a claimant who could not prove that the guilty dust alone caused the disease could still recover if it made a material contribution, meaning a contribution more than negligible, to his illness. The negligent source need not be the main cause, and the but for test is modified in such cases of cumulative cause. The fact that most of the dust came from an innocent source does not defeat the claim. A doubling of risk is not the test. Later cases suggest apportionment where the disease is divisible.
Law basis: Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613Question 4 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Saul develops mesothelioma after being negligently exposed to asbestos while working successively for three employers. Medical science cannot establish which employer's exposure caused the single fibre that triggered the disease. Saul sues all three. Which of the following best describes the test for causation?
- Each employer is liable if its breach materially increased the risk of the disease.Correct answer
- None is liable, as Saul cannot prove on the balance of probabilities which caused the disease.
- Only the employer responsible for the longest period of exposure is liable to Saul.
- Each is liable if its exposure made a material contribution to the disease itself.
- Only the last employer is liable, as its exposure was the most recent before diagnosis.
In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd the House of Lords created an exception to the but for test for mesothelioma, where science cannot identify which exposure caused the disease. A defendant whose negligent exposure materially increased the risk of the claimant contracting mesothelioma is treated as having caused it. This differs from material contribution to the disease in Bonnington, because the issue is evidential uncertainty about a single causal event. The exception is limited and is not about the length or timing of exposure. Saul can therefore establish causation against each employer.
Law basis: Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22Question 5 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Orla contracts mesothelioma after negligent exposure to asbestos by three successive employers. Two of the employers have been dissolved and had no insurance. The third, Fabricon Ltd, which was responsible for about a third of her exposure, is solvent. Which of the following best describes what Orla can recover from Fabricon?
- Full compensation, as each liable employer is jointly and severally liable.Correct answer
- One third of her damages, reflecting Fabricon's share of the increase in risk.
- Nothing, as she cannot prove that Fabricon's exposure caused her disease.
- Half of her damages, as the law splits liability equally where others cannot pay.
- One third of her damages, with the remainder paid from a statutory fund.
In Barker v Corus UK Ltd the House of Lords held that liability under the Fairchild exception was proportionate to each defendant's contribution to the risk. Parliament reversed this for mesothelioma in section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006, which makes a responsible person liable for the whole of the damage, jointly and severally with any other responsible person. Fabricon is therefore liable to Orla in full, though it may seek contribution from others and must bear the burden of their insolvency. Proportionate liability under Barker still applies to non-mesothelioma cases within Fairchild.
Law basis: Compensation Act 2006 s 3; Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20 ↗Question 6 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
A premature baby develops a retinal condition causing blindness. A junior doctor negligently allowed excess oxygen to be given to him, which is one of five possible causes of the condition; the other four were conditions common in premature babies and not linked to negligence. The experts cannot say which caused it. Which of the following best describes causation?
- The claimant succeeds, as the negligence materially increased the risk of blindness.
- The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the oxygen did not cause the condition.
- The claimant succeeds, as the negligence made a material contribution to the condition.
- The claimant recovers one fifth of his damages, reflecting one of five possible causes.
- The claimant must still prove that the oxygen probably caused it.Correct answer
In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority the House of Lords held that the claimant had to prove on the balance of probabilities that the excess oxygen caused his blindness. The case involved several distinct possible causes, only one of which was negligent, so the material increase in risk approach from McGhee and later Fairchild did not apply. Nor was this a case of cumulative causes making a material contribution, as in Bonnington. The burden does not shift to the defendant, and there is no proportionate recovery based on the number of possible causes. A retrial on causation was ordered.
Law basis: Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074Question 7 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Theo, aged 13, falls from a tree and injures his hip. The hospital negligently fails to diagnose the injury for five days. He develops a permanent disability. Experts say there was a 75% chance that he would have developed the disability even with prompt treatment. He claims 25% of his full damages for the lost chance. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- He recovers 25% of full damages, reflecting the lost chance of a good recovery.
- He recovers full damages, as the hospital's negligence materially increased the risk.
- He recovers 75% of full damages, as the delay was a significant contributing cause.
- His claim fails, as the hospital owes no duty to treat injuries caused by the patient.
- His claim fails, as he cannot prove the delay probably caused it.Correct answer
In Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority the House of Lords held that a claimant who, on the balance of probabilities, would have suffered the disability anyway could not recover damages for the lost 25% chance of avoiding it. Causation in personal injury is decided on an all-or-nothing basis: if it is more likely than not that the harm would have occurred without the negligence, causation fails. Gregg v Scott confirmed that damages for loss of a chance are not generally available in clinical negligence. The hospital did owe Theo a duty; the claim fails on causation.
Law basis: Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750Question 8 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Dr Wren negligently diagnoses a lump in Malcolm's arm as benign. The cancer is diagnosed nine months later. As a result of the delay, Malcolm's chance of surviving ten years falls from 42% to 25%. He is still alive at trial. He sues for the reduction in his chance of survival. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- He recovers damages representing the 17% reduction in his chance of survival.
- He recovers full damages, as the delay was a breach that worsened his prospects.
- He recovers nothing, as a claimant who is still alive has suffered no loss at all.
- He recovers 42% of full damages, reflecting the chance he had before the delay.
- He cannot recover for the reduced chance, as it was always below 50%.Correct answer
In Gregg v Scott the House of Lords, by a majority, held that a claimant could not recover damages for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome where, even without the negligence, he would probably not have survived ten years. Because his original chance was below 50%, he could not prove on the balance of probabilities that the negligence caused him to lose a cure. The majority declined to introduce loss of chance into personal injury, contrasting cases of economic loss depending on third parties. Damages may be recoverable for any proven additional physical injury, but not for the percentage reduction.
Law basis: Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2Question 9 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
A firm of solicitors acting for Allied Ltd on a business acquisition negligently fails to negotiate a warranty protecting it against certain liabilities. Allied shows that it would have asked for the warranty. Whether the seller would have agreed depends on how the seller would have responded. Which of the following best describes how causation is decided?
- Allied must prove on the balance of probabilities that the seller would have agreed.
- Allied must show a real and substantial chance that the seller would have agreed.Correct answer
- Allied recovers in full once it proves that the solicitors were negligent.
- Allied cannot recover, as the seller's hypothetical response is too speculative.
- Allied must show a certainty that the seller would have agreed to the warranty.
In Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons the Court of Appeal held that where the claimant's loss depends on the hypothetical action of a third party, the claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities what it would itself have done, but need only show a real and substantial, rather than speculative, chance that the third party would have acted to its benefit. The damages are then assessed by valuing that chance. This contrasts with personal injury cases such as Hotson and Gregg v Scott, where loss of chance is generally not recoverable.
Law basis: Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602Question 10 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Kwame's leg is injured in a road accident caused by Dale, leaving him with a permanent limp and reduced earnings. Two years later Kwame is shot in the same leg by robbers, and the leg has to be amputated. Dale argues that his liability for lost earnings ends at the date of the shooting. Which of the following best describes the position?
- Dale remains liable for the original disability's effects despite the later tort.Correct answer
- Dale's liability ends at the shooting, as the amputation has replaced his injury.
- Dale is liable for the amputation, as it was a foreseeable result of the original injury.
- Dale's liability is reduced by half, as both torts now contribute to the loss of the leg.
- Dale's liability ends at the shooting, as the robbers' act broke the chain of causation.
In Baker v Willoughby the House of Lords held that a first tortfeasor remained liable for the continuing effects of the original injury, even though a later tort by a different person caused a more serious injury that subsumed it. Otherwise the claimant would fall between two stools, as the second tortfeasor takes the claimant as he finds him and is liable only for the additional harm. Dale is not liable for the amputation, which was not caused by his negligence. The shooting does not break the chain for the losses already flowing from the original injury.
Law basis: Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467Question 11 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Pietro suffers a back injury at work because of his employer's negligence, which reduces his earning capacity by half. Three years later he develops an unrelated spinal disease which would have made him totally unable to work in any event. Which of the following best describes the employer's liability for lost earnings after the disease develops?
- It continues for his working life, as in Baker v Willoughby the first tortfeasor remains liable.
- It continues, but is reduced to reflect the chance that the disease would have occurred.
- It ends when the disease develops, as he would then have been unable to work anyway.Correct answer
- It ends at trial, as later illness is irrelevant once the claim has been issued.
- It continues in full, as the disease and the back injury are both injuries to his spine.
In Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd the House of Lords held that, where a supervening natural illness unconnected with the tort would have disabled the claimant anyway, the defendant's liability for loss of earnings ends when the illness takes effect. The vicissitudes of life must be taken into account, because the claimant should not be over-compensated. Baker v Willoughby was distinguished as a case of a supervening tort, though its reasoning was criticised. Here the disease is not a tort, so the general principle of putting Pietro in the position he would have been in applies, ending recovery.
Law basis: Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794Question 12 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Jack negligently overturns his car near the exit of a busy one-way tunnel. A police inspector at the scene forgets to close the tunnel and then orders PC Ash to ride his motorcycle back through the tunnel against the traffic. PC Ash collides with an oncoming car and is injured. He sues Jack. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- It succeeds, as PC Ash's injury was a foreseeable result of the original accident.
- It fails, as the inspector's negligent order broke the chain of causation.Correct answer
- It succeeds, as Jack's negligence was the reason the police attended the scene.
- It fails, as police officers accept the risks of attending road accidents.
- It succeeds, but damages are reduced because the inspector was partly to blame.
In Knightley v Johns the Court of Appeal held that the inspector's negligent decision to order a constable to ride against the traffic was a new intervening act that broke the chain of causation between the original driver's negligence and the constable's injury. The intervention was not a natural or foreseeable consequence of the accident; it was a serious mistake by a third party which created a new and independent risk. Although the police attendance was foreseeable, what matters is whether the subsequent act was reasonably foreseeable in the sense required. Officers do not accept all such risks.
Law basis: Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349Question 13 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
After an injury at work caused by his employer's negligence, Rhodri's leg sometimes gives way without warning. Visiting a flat, he begins to walk down a steep staircase with no handrail, without waiting for help and while carrying his young daughter. His leg gives way and he jumps, breaking his ankle. Which of the following best describes the employer's liability for the ankle injury?
- It is liable, as the leg giving way was a direct result of the original injury.
- It is not liable, as Rhodri's unreasonable conduct broke the chain of causation.Correct answer
- It is liable in full, as the defendant must take the claimant's weakened leg as it finds it.
- It is liable, but damages are reduced for Rhodri's contributory negligence.
- It is not liable, as the flat's occupier is solely responsible for the unsafe stairs.
In McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd the House of Lords held that a claimant who, knowing that his injured leg might give way, descended a steep staircase without a handrail and without assistance acted so unreasonably that his conduct broke the chain of causation. The further injury was therefore not attributable to the original negligence. Where a claimant's conduct is merely careless rather than wholly unreasonable, contributory negligence may be the better analysis. The thin skull rule concerns the extent of damage from the original injury, not the claimant's own later unreasonable acts.
Law basis: McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621Question 14 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Lewis suffers severe head injuries in an accident at work caused by his employer's negligence. He develops severe depression as a result and, six years later, takes his own life. His widow brings a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The employer argues that the suicide was a voluntary act. Which of the following best describes the position?
- The suicide breaks the chain, as it was a deliberate and voluntary act by Lewis.
- The suicide breaks the chain, as six years is too long for any causal connection.
- The suicide does not break the chain, as it flowed from the depression.Correct answer
- The suicide does not break the chain, but only if Lewis lacked capacity when he died.
- The suicide breaks the chain, as depression is not a foreseeable result of head injury.
In Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd the House of Lords held that a suicide resulting from depression caused by the defendant's negligence did not break the chain of causation. The depression was a foreseeable consequence of the injury, and the suicide flowed from it; it was not a truly voluntary, informed choice of the kind that would amount to a novus actus interveniens. It was not necessary for the deceased to be legally insane or to lack capacity. The passage of time does not by itself break the chain where the causal connection is established on the medical evidence.
Law basis: Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13Question 15 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
A neurosurgeon fails to warn Rosa of a small (1-2%) inherent risk of nerve damage from spinal surgery. She has the operation and the risk materialises without any negligence in the surgery itself. Rosa shows that, had she been warned, she would have taken time to seek further advice and had the surgery later, when the risk would have been the same. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- She cannot recover, as she would have had the operation anyway with the same risk.
- She can recover only if the surgery itself was carried out negligently by the surgeon.
- She cannot recover, as a 1-2% risk is too small to be material to any patient.
- She can recover, but only nominal damages for the infringement of her autonomy.
- She can recover, to protect her right to make an informed choice.Correct answer
In Chester v Afshar the House of Lords, by a majority, held that a claimant who had not been warned of a small inherent risk could recover even though she would have had the operation at a later date with the same risk. Conventional but for causation was not satisfied, but liability was imposed on policy grounds to vindicate the patient's right to make an informed decision. The claimant must show that, if warned, she would not have had the operation when she did. After Montgomery, materiality depends on the reasonable patient, not a fixed percentage. Full damages were awarded.
Law basis: Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41Question 16 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Ian's car is damaged in a collision caused by Tyra, and needs a respray of its lower body. Two weeks later, before any repair, Jess negligently drives into the same car, damaging the same area. Ian sues Jess for the cost of the respray. Which of the following best describes Jess's liability for the respray?
- She is liable, as her collision independently made the respray necessary.
- She is liable for half the cost, as both drivers damaged the same area of the car.
- She is liable in full, but can claim a contribution from Tyra for half the cost.
- She is not liable, as the car already needed a respray.Correct answer
- She is not liable, as the earlier collision breaks the chain of causation for her.
In Performance Cars Ltd v Abraham the Court of Appeal held that a second defendant was not liable for the cost of a respray that was already needed because of damage caused by an earlier collision. The second collision did not cause any loss in respect of the respray, because the car was already in that condition. Ian's claim for the respray lies against Tyra. The case is an application of the but for test, not of a break in the chain caused by the earlier collision, and the two drivers are not jointly liable for the same loss.
Law basis: Performance Cars Ltd v Abraham [1962] 1 QB 33Question 17 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
After surgery, Nia is left very weak. Her weakness is caused partly by the hospital's negligent post-operative care and partly by an unrelated pancreatitis for which the hospital was not to blame. Because of the weakness, she cannot clear her airway after vomiting and suffers brain damage. The court cannot say which cause was greater. Which of the following best describes causation?
- The hospital is not liable, as she cannot prove that its negligence was the main cause.
- The hospital is liable for half her damages, as there were two equal contributing causes.
- The hospital is not liable, as the pancreatitis was an intervening event breaking the chain.
- The hospital is liable in full, as its negligence materially contributed to her weakness.Correct answer
- The hospital is liable only if its negligence doubled the risk of her brain damage.
In Bailey v Ministry of Defence the Court of Appeal held that where medical science cannot establish the probability that but for an act of negligence the injury would not have happened, but can establish that the negligent contribution was more than negligible, the but for test is modified and the claimant succeeds. Here the hospital's negligence materially contributed to the weakness which caused the injury, so the hospital was liable in full, applying Bonnington. There was no basis for apportionment, as the injury was indivisible, and the pancreatitis was a concurrent cause, not a new intervening act.
Law basis: Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 883Question 18 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Mabel trips over a defective step at her bank and injures her knee, which had previously been weak. A hospital doctor later negligently advises an above-knee amputation which a competent doctor would not have recommended. The bank argues that the doctor's negligence broke the chain of causation for the amputation. Which of the following best describes the position?
- The chain is broken, as any negligent medical treatment is a new intervening act.
- The chain is broken, as the amputation resulted from a deliberate decision by a doctor.
- The chain is not broken, as the doctor's error was not grossly negligent.Correct answer
- The chain is not broken, as the bank must take the claimant's weak knee as it finds it.
- The chain is not broken, so the bank alone is liable and cannot seek any contribution.
In Webb v Barclays Bank plc the Court of Appeal held that negligent medical treatment of an injury caused by the defendant will not break the chain of causation unless it is so grossly negligent as to eclipse the original wrongdoing. Medical treatment, even if negligent, is a foreseeable consequence of injury. Here the doctor's negligence was not of that order, so the bank remained liable, but it obtained a contribution from the hospital under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. The thin skull rule explains why the weak knee does not limit damages, not why the chain is unbroken.
Law basis: Webb v Barclays Bank plc [2001] EWCA Civ 1141Question 19 · CausationDraft, pending solicitor review
Enid dies of mesothelioma. She worked for a single employer in an office where she was negligently exposed to low levels of asbestos. The rest of her exposure came from the general environment. Her employer's exposure increased her risk of mesothelioma by about 18%. Which of the following best describes causation?
- She must prove that the employer's exposure at least doubled her risk of the disease.
- The Fairchild exception does not apply, as she had only one negligent employer.
- She must prove on the balance of probabilities that the employer's fibres caused it.
- The Fairchild exception applies only if the employer's exposure was the main source.
- The Fairchild exception applies, and a material increase in risk is sufficient.Correct answer
In Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd the Supreme Court held that the Fairchild exception applies to mesothelioma even where there is only one negligent defendant and the other exposure was environmental. The claimant need only show that the defendant's negligent exposure materially increased the risk, meaning more than minimally. The court rejected the argument that the claimant must show the exposure at least doubled the risk. The ordinary balance of probabilities test does not apply in mesothelioma because of the scientific uncertainty, and the employer's exposure need not be the main source.
Law basis: Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22More Tort Law topics
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