Law covered in these questions
- Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4
- Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605
- Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
- Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92
- Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146
- Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966
- Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431
- Harrison v British Railways Board [1981] 3 All ER 679
- McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59
- Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52
- Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530
- Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615
- Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50
- Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211
All 16 questions with answers
Try them above first, then read the worked answers below.
Question 1 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Police officers arrest a suspected drug dealer on a busy pavement. During the struggle the officers and the suspect fall onto Edna, an elderly passer-by, who is injured. The force argues that the police enjoy general immunity in negligence. Which of the following best describes the position?
- The police owe no duty to members of the public when carrying out arrests, on grounds of public policy.
- A duty arises only if the court is satisfied, applying the three-stage Caparo test afresh, that one would be fair.
- No duty is owed because Edna's injury was caused by the suspect's resistance rather than by the officers.
- A duty arises only if the police had assumed responsibility for Edna's safety before the arrest began.
- The officers owe Edna a duty because they caused her injury by a positive act, applying ordinary principles.Correct answer
In Robinson the Supreme Court held that the police are subject to the ordinary law of negligence when their positive acts foreseeably cause physical injury. There is no general police immunity; Hill only protects the police from liability for failing to protect people from harm caused by others. Nor is Caparo a test to be reapplied in every case: where the situation falls within an established category, such as foreseeable physical injury caused by a positive act, the duty follows from existing principle. An assumption of responsibility is needed only for omissions.
Law basis: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4Question 2 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Farah is injured by an autonomous delivery robot operated by a start-up. There is no previous authority on whether the operator of such a robot owes a duty to pedestrians in this precise context. Her solicitor is asked how a court will decide whether a duty exists. Which approach will the court take?
- It will ask only whether harm to Farah was reasonably foreseeable, as foreseeability alone establishes a duty.
- It will refuse to recognise a duty until Parliament legislates, because the courts cannot create new categories.
- It will apply the neighbour principle in Donoghue v Stevenson as a complete statutory-style test for all cases.
- It will find a duty only if the operator expressly assumed responsibility to Farah before the accident occurred.
- It will reason incrementally by analogy with established categories of duty.Correct answer
Robinson explains that the courts start from established categories of duty and develop the law incrementally by analogy. Only in a genuinely novel case do they consider the Caparo factors of foreseeability, proximity and whether imposing a duty is fair, just and reasonable, and even then Caparo is not a rigid formula. Foreseeability alone is not enough, and the neighbour principle is a general guide rather than a complete test. In fact this situation is close to the established duty not to cause physical injury by positive acts, which would strongly support a duty.
Law basis: Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4Question 3 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Ravi buys a bottle of kombucha from a café and gives it to his sister Meera. The drink is contaminated during manufacture and Meera becomes seriously ill. Meera has no contract with the café or the manufacturer. Which of the following best describes Meera's position in negligence against the manufacturer?
- The manufacturer owes her a duty as an ultimate consumer, despite the absence of any contract.Correct answer
- She cannot sue the manufacturer because only Ravi, as the buyer, has a cause of action.
- She can sue the manufacturer only if she can show that Ravi told the café the drink was for her.
- She must sue the café, which is strictly liable to every consumer for the quality of what it sells.
- She has no claim in negligence because the loss of a contaminated drink is pure economic loss.
Donoghue v Stevenson established that a manufacturer of products intended to reach the ultimate consumer without reasonable possibility of intermediate examination owes that consumer a duty to take reasonable care. Privity of contract is irrelevant to a claim in negligence. Meera's loss is personal injury, not pure economic loss, so it is recoverable. The café may have contractual liability to Ravi, but that does not give Meera a strict claim against it, and nothing turns on whether the café knew for whom the drink was bought.
Law basis: Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562Question 4 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Ted negligently rides his motorcycle into a car. Gail, who is standing about 50 metres away and out of sight of the collision, hears the crash and later sees blood on the road. She suffers nervous shock. She was never at risk of physical injury and knew none of those involved. Which of the following best describes whether Ted owed her a duty?
- A duty was owed because every road user owes a duty to anyone injured as a result of an accident.
- A duty was owed because shock to bystanders is always a foreseeable result of a road collision.
- No duty was owed because a motorcyclist owes a duty only to the occupants of other vehicles.
- No duty was owed because Gail was not a person whom Ted could reasonably foresee being harmed.Correct answer
- A duty was owed because Gail heard the crash and so was in proximity to it in time and space.
A duty is owed only to claimants within the range of foreseeable harm. In Bourhill v Young the House of Lords held that a motorcyclist owed no duty to a woman who heard a collision from some distance away and suffered shock, because she was not within the area of potential danger and harm to her was not reasonably foreseeable. Proximity in time and space is relevant to secondary victims, but a stranger with no tie of love and affection to the victims cannot recover in any event. Duty is owed to foreseeable claimants, not to the world at large.
Law basis: Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92Question 5 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Owen parks his van on a slope without applying the handbrake. It begins to roll towards a group of children. Gwen, a passer-by, runs into the road and pushes the children clear but is struck by the van and injured. Owen argues that Gwen chose to put herself in danger. Which of the following best describes Gwen's position?
- Owen owes Gwen a duty as a foreseeable rescuer, and her intervention does not defeat the claim.Correct answer
- Owen owes no duty to Gwen because his duty was owed only to the children who were put in danger.
- Gwen's claim fails because she voluntarily accepted the risk of injury by running into the road.
- Gwen's deliberate act of intervening breaks the chain of causation between Owen's negligence and her injury.
- Gwen can recover only if she was related to one of the children, as rescuers must be close relatives.
A person who negligently creates a danger owes an independent duty to those who foreseeably come to the rescue. Rescue is regarded as a natural and probable consequence of the danger, so a reasonable rescue does not break the chain of causation and the rescuer is not treated as consenting to the risk. Haynes v Harwood concerned a runaway horse in a busy street. There is no requirement that the rescuer be related to the person in danger; a stranger acting reasonably in an emergency is protected. Volenti is rarely, if ever, applied to a rescuer acting under moral pressure.
Law basis: Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146; Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966Question 6 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Through careless use of a blowtorch, Dean sets fire to his house. Kofi, a professional firefighter, attends and is injured when part of the ceiling collapses while he is tackling the blaze. Dean argues that firefighters accept the risks of their job. Which of the following best describes Kofi's position?
- Kofi cannot recover because a professional rescuer is taken to consent to all risks of the job.
- Kofi can recover only if Dean's conduct amounted to gross negligence or recklessness.
- Dean owes Kofi no duty because the fire service, not the householder, controls the fire scene.
- Kofi can recover only from his employer, which must provide him with a safe system of work.
- Dean owes Kofi a duty, and the fact that firefighting is his job does not prevent recovery.Correct answer
In Ogwo v Taylor the House of Lords held that a person who negligently starts a fire owes a duty to the firefighters who foreseeably attend to put it out. A professional rescuer is in no worse position than a lay rescuer, and there is no 'fireman's rule' barring recovery. The ordinary risks of firefighting are foreseeable consequences of the negligence. Consent is not inferred merely because the claimant is paid to face the risk, and there is no requirement of gross negligence. Kofi's employer may owe separate duties, but that does not displace Dean's liability.
Law basis: Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431Question 7 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Joel, a passenger, carelessly tries to jump onto a moving train as it leaves the platform and is left hanging from the door. Hamish, the guard, tries to pull him in and is badly injured. Hamish sues Joel. Joel argues that he owed a duty only to himself. Which of the following best describes the law?
- A person owes no duty in respect of risks he creates only to his own safety, so Joel is not liable.
- A person who carelessly puts himself in danger can owe a duty to a foreseeable rescuer.Correct answer
- Joel is not liable because the rail company, as the guard's employer, is solely responsible.
- Joel owes a duty only if he called out for help, since otherwise the rescue was unforeseeable.
- Hamish cannot recover because a rescuer may sue only the person who endangered someone else.
A rescuer may sue a person who negligently imperils himself, because it is foreseeable that someone will try to help. In Harrison v British Railways Board a guard injured while trying to save a passenger who had attempted to board a moving train was held to be owed a duty by that passenger, although his damages were reduced for his own contributory negligence. The duty to rescuers does not depend on a third party being endangered, nor on a call for help. The employer's separate obligations do not remove the passenger's own liability.
Law basis: Harrison v British Railways Board [1981] 3 All ER 679Question 8 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Paula's husband undergoes a vasectomy. The surgeon negligently tells them that he is sterile and they stop using contraception. Paula becomes pregnant and gives birth to a healthy son. She claims damages for the cost of bringing him up until adulthood. Which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
- The full costs of raising the child are recoverable as a foreseeable consequence of the negligent advice.
- Nothing is recoverable at all, because the birth of a healthy child can never be treated as a harm.
- The costs of raising a healthy child are not recoverable, though a conventional award may be made.Correct answer
- The costs of raising the child are recoverable, but reduced to reflect the benefits of parenthood.
- Only the costs of raising the child until the age of five are recoverable, as a compromise figure.
In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board the House of Lords held that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to award the costs of bringing up a healthy child born after negligent sterilisation advice. The mother could recover for the pain and inconvenience of pregnancy and birth and associated losses. In Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital the House of Lords added a conventional award of £15,000 to mark the wrong done to the parent's autonomy. A set-off approach weighing the benefits of parenthood was rejected, and there is no rule limiting costs to a fixed age.
Law basis: McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52Question 9 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Following a negligently performed sterilisation, Ines gives birth to a daughter who is born with a serious congenital disability unconnected with the operation. Ines claims the costs of raising her daughter. Which of the following best describes what she is likely to recover in respect of upbringing costs?
- The full costs of raising the child, because a disabled child falls outside the McFarlane principle.
- Nothing for upbringing, because the disability was not caused by the negligent operation.
- Only a conventional award, since McFarlane bars any claim for the costs of raising any child.
- The additional costs attributable to the disability, but not the ordinary costs of raising a child.Correct answer
- The ordinary costs of upbringing, but not the extra costs, which are a matter for the state.
In Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust the Court of Appeal held that, where a child born after negligent sterilisation is disabled, the parent may recover the extra costs of bringing up the child that are attributable to the disability. The ordinary costs of raising a healthy child remain irrecoverable under McFarlane. The fact that the disability was not caused by the operation does not bar the claim, because the birth itself was a foreseeable consequence of the negligence. A conventional award may also be available, but it is not the only recovery.
Law basis: Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530Question 10 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Nadia instructs a barrister, Marcus, to represent her at a civil trial. Marcus fails to call a key witness whose evidence would almost certainly have won the case. Nadia loses and wishes to sue Marcus in negligence. Marcus says advocates are immune from suit for conduct in court. Which of the following best describes the current law?
- Marcus is immune because his conduct took place in court in the course of the trial itself.
- Marcus can be sued only for his advice before trial, as immunity still covers in-court work.
- Marcus is immune in civil cases, although advocates in criminal cases may now be sued.
- Marcus can be sued only if he acted dishonestly, since negligence by advocates is not actionable.
- Advocates no longer enjoy immunity, so Marcus can be sued in negligence.Correct answer
In Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons the House of Lords abolished the immunity of advocates from claims in negligence, in both civil and criminal proceedings, and covering conduct in court as well as preparatory work. The ordinary principles of professional negligence therefore apply, and Nadia would need to show breach and that, but for it, she would have won or had a real and substantial chance of a better outcome. A collateral attack on a criminal conviction may still be an abuse of process, but that is a different principle from immunity.
Law basis: Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615Question 11 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Sami attends hospital A&E with a head injury. The receptionist tells him he will wait four to five hours, when in fact a triage nurse would have seen him within 30 minutes. Sami leaves and later collapses at home, suffering permanent brain damage. The trust argues that receptionists owe no duty to give waiting-time information. Which of the following best describes the position?
- No duty is owed because a receptionist is not medically qualified and gives only administrative information.
- No duty is owed because Sami's injury resulted from his own free decision to leave the hospital.
- The trust owes Sami a duty within the established category of a hospital's duty to patients.Correct answer
- A duty is owed only if Sami can satisfy all three stages of the Caparo test as a novel claim.
- A duty is owed only if the receptionist expressly assumed responsibility for Sami's medical care.
In Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust the Supreme Court held that a hospital A&E department owes a duty to patients who have booked in to take reasonable care not to give misleading information about waiting times. This fell within the established category of a health service provider's duty to its patients, so there was no need to apply Caparo afresh. The duty is owed by the trust, not just by medically qualified staff. Whether leaving broke the chain of causation was decided on the facts; Sami's decision to leave was a foreseeable response to the misinformation.
Law basis: Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50Question 12 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
A ship classification society carelessly certifies a damaged cargo ship as seaworthy after a temporary repair. The ship sinks and the cargo owners lose their cargo. They have no contract with the society. They sue it in negligence. Which of the following best describes the likely result?
- A duty is owed because loss of the cargo was a foreseeable consequence of a careless survey.
- No duty is owed, because imposing one would not be fair, just and reasonable in that context.Correct answer
- A duty is owed because the loss is physical damage to property, which is always recoverable.
- No duty is owed because the cargo owners suffered only pure economic loss, which is never recoverable.
- A duty is owed because a classification society is a public authority exercising statutory powers.
In Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd the House of Lords held that a classification society owed no duty to cargo owners, even though the damage was physical and foreseeable. Imposing a duty would not be fair, just and reasonable because of the society's independent, non-profit role in promoting safety at sea, the existing international scheme allocating risk between shipowners and cargo owners, and the likelihood of defensive practice. The loss was physical damage, not pure economic loss, so that is not the reason. The society is not a public authority.
Law basis: Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211Question 13 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
Lucy, who knows she is seven months pregnant, drives carelessly and crashes into a wall. Her son is later born with injuries caused by the crash. Lucy's insurer argues that a mother can never be liable to her own child for events before birth. Which of the following best describes the position?
- Lucy cannot be liable because the child had no legal personality at the time of the crash.
- Lucy cannot be liable because a mother is never liable to her own child for pre-birth injury.
- Lucy can be liable only if she was driving in breach of a criminal offence such as drink-driving.
- Lucy can be liable, as a pregnant driver owes a duty to her unborn child.Correct answer
- Lucy can be liable only if the child was born more than six months after the crash happened.
Under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 a child born disabled because of an occurrence affecting a parent can sue the person responsible once born alive. The mother is generally not liable to her own child, but section 2 makes an exception: a woman driving a motor vehicle when she knows, or ought reasonably to know, that she is pregnant owes the same duty to her unborn child as she owes to other road users. That exception reflects compulsory motor insurance. No criminal offence is required, and there is no time requirement between crash and birth.
Law basis: Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 ss 1-2 ↗Question 14 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
During an amateur under-19 rugby match, the referee repeatedly fails to enforce the rules on collapsing scrums despite warnings. A scrum collapses and Nathan, a player, suffers a spinal injury. The referee argues that match officials owe no duty to players. Which of the following best describes the position?
- The referee owes the players a duty to take reasonable care for their safety.Correct answer
- No duty is owed because players consent to all the risks inherent in a contact sport.
- No duty is owed because the referee is an unpaid volunteer rather than a professional official.
- A duty is owed only to spectators, as players' safety is solely the responsibility of their coaches.
- A duty is owed, but it is breached only if the referee intended a player to be injured.
In Smoldon v Whitworth the Court of Appeal held that a rugby referee owed a duty to players to take reasonable care for their safety, and that it was breached by failing to enforce the scrummaging rules designed to prevent spinal injuries. The standard takes account of the fast pace of the game, so ordinary errors of judgement will not amount to breach. Players consent to risks inherent in play within the rules, not to a referee's failure to enforce safety rules. Volunteer status does not remove the duty, and no intention to injure is needed.
Law basis: Smoldon v Whitworth [1997] PIQR P133Question 15 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
A manufacturer sells a defective ladder which collapses and injures Priyanka, a domestic user. The manufacturer argues that it owes no duty because the ladder passed through a wholesaler and a retailer before reaching her, and the retailer could have inspected it. Neither was expected to examine it. Which of the following best describes the position?
- No duty is owed because the retailer, as the last party in the chain, had the chance to inspect.
- No duty is owed because the ladder reached Priyanka through two intermediate commercial sellers.
- A duty is owed only if Priyanka bought the ladder directly from the manufacturer's own website.
- A duty is owed only if the manufacturer knew that this ladder had the specific defect when sold.
- A duty is owed, as no intermediate examination was reasonably expected.Correct answer
The narrow rule in Donoghue v Stevenson applies where products reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left the manufacturer, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination. What matters is whether examination was reasonably to be expected, not whether someone could theoretically have inspected the goods. A mere opportunity for inspection by distributors does not relieve the manufacturer. In Grant v Australian Knitting Mills the duty applied despite goods passing through retailers. Knowledge of the specific defect is not needed; the question is whether reasonable care was taken.
Law basis: Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85Question 16 · Duty of careDraft, pending solicitor review
An NHS trust's ambulance crew, responding to an emergency call, drives carefully but the vehicle skids on an unexpected patch of oil and hits Greta, a pedestrian. Greta's solicitor must decide which element of negligence is most likely to be in issue. Which of the following best describes the position?
- No duty is owed because emergency services are immune from claims while responding to calls.
- No duty is owed because the crew's duty was owed only to the patient they were going to help.
- A duty is owed only if the crew had sounded their sirens, which creates a relationship with pedestrians.
- A duty is plainly owed to Greta, so the real issue is whether it was breached.Correct answer
- A duty is owed only if Greta can show that the trust had assumed responsibility for her safety.
Drivers owe a duty of care to other road users, including pedestrians, and emergency drivers are no exception. This is a classic established category of foreseeable physical injury caused by a positive act, so no novel duty analysis or assumption of responsibility is needed. Emergency services have no blanket immunity. The social value of the journey may be relevant to the standard of care under the general approach in Watt v Hertfordshire and section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006, but the duty itself is clear. Here the crew drove carefully, so breach is the live issue.
Law basis: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; Watt v Hertfordshire CC [1954] 1 WLR 835More Tort Law topics
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